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**Reproducibility and Replicability
in Psychology and Experimental Philosophy**

14-16 June 2018, University College London
Organised by Lara Kirfel (UCL) & Dr Pascale Willemsen (RUB)

Xphi2018.weebly.com

Conference Venue:

1-19 Torrington Place
 Lecture Halls G12 & G13 (Ground Floor)
 University College London
 London WC1E 7HB
<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/maps/1-19-torrington-place>

Poster Session Venue

Jeremy Bentham Room
 UCL Main Building
<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/maps/jeremy-bentham-room>

Thursday, 14th June 2018		
Entrance Hall / Room G10		
12:30 - 13:00	Registration and Coffee	
G12		
13:00 - 13:05	Welcome (Lara Kirfel & Pascale Willemsen)	
13:05 - 14:00	<i>Keynote</i> David Shanks (UCL): ““Is reproducible research on consciousness possible?”	
14:00 – 15:00	<i>Keynote</i> Deborah Mayo	
15:00 - 15:30	Coffee & Snacks	
	G12	G13
15:30 - 16:15	<i>Samuel Fletcher</i> (Minnesota) “Some Foundational Considerations for Making Replication Mainstream.”	<i>Ivar Hannikainen and Florian Cova</i> (Rio de Janeiro, Geneva) “Does reflection underlie consequentialist attitudes across moral domains? A meta-analysis”
16:15 – 17:00	<i>Bartosz Maćkiewicz and Katarzyna Kuś</i> (Warsaw) “What does it take to make your research reproducible and why should you care?”	<i>Kevin Reuter, Jörg Löschke and Monika Betzler</i> (Bern) “What is a colleague?”
Jeremy Bentham Room (UCL Main Building)		
17:15 - 18:30	Poster Session and Drinks	

Poster Session

1. Cara Maritz (John Hopkins): *“Experimental Philosophy of Language: A Methodological Review”*
2. Philipp Schönegger and Johannes Wagner (Graz): *“The Moral Behaviour of Ethics Professors: Relationships among Expressed Normative Attitude and Self-Reported Behaviour. A Replication-Extension in German-Speaking Countries”*
3. Tobias Koch (Bochum): *“Don’t Tell Me Stories!”*
4. Neele Engelmann (Göttingen): *“The Interaction between Causality, Foreseeability, and Outcome Valence in Attributions of Moral Responsibility”*
5. Simon Stephan, Neele Engelmann and Lara Kirfel (Göttingen, UCL) *“The influence of learned statistical abnormality on singular causation judgments.”*
6. Nick Axten (Bristol): *“Measuring Publication Bias in Psychology: Some Early Research”*
7. Robin Kopecký and Michaela Košová (Prague): *“How virtue signalling makes us better: Moral preference of selection of types of autonomous vehicles”*
8. Su Wu and Junwei Huang (Reading): *“Cross-field Differences in Philosophical Expertise”*
9. Francesca Bonalumi, Margherita Isella and John Michael (CEU, Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Warwick): *“Cueing Implicit Commitment.”*
10. Denis Omar Verduga Palencia and Magda Osman (Queen Mary, London): *“A Platform for analysis of human foraging tasks in a computer game context.”*
11. Adrian Ziółkowski (Warsaw): *“Explaining away undesired knowledge attributions: protagonist projection”*
12. Silvia Ivani, Matteo Colombo and Leandra Bucher (Tilburg, Wuppertal) *“Uncertainty in Science: A Study on the Role of Non-Cognitive Values in the Assessment of Inductive Risk.”*
13. Wanqing Xu (Beijing): *“Corporations Are Proper Moral Responsibility Bearers The Evidence from Experimental Philosophy.”*

Friday, 15th June 2018		
G12		
10:00 - 11:00	<i>Keynote</i> Florian Cova	
	G12	G13
11:00 - 11:45	Noah van Dongen, Felipe Romero, Matteo Colombo Colombo and Jan Sprenger (Turin, Tilburg, Groningen) "Meta-analysis of Semantic Intuition Research"	Miguel Vadillo, Natalie Gold and Magda Osman (Madrid, Oxford, London) "Searching for the bottom of the ego well: Failure to uncover ego depletion in Many Labs 3"
11:45 – 12:30	Ethan Landes (St Andrews) "The Metalinguistics of the Intuition Debate"	Eugen Fischer and Paul Engelhardt (East Anglia) "Lingering Stereotypes and Automatic Inferences: Discovery and Conceptual Replication of a Salience Effect ""
12:30 – 13:45	<i>Lunch Break</i>	
	G12	G13
13:45 – 14:30	Kathryn Francis, Nat Hansen and Philip Beaman (Reading) "Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism"	Vilius Dranseika (Vilnius) "On the Ambiguity of 'the Same Person'"
14:30 – 15:15	Adrian Ziolkowski and Nathan Otteman (Warsaw, Leuven) "Are there non-factual facts?"	Michaela Košová and Robin Kopecký (Prague) "My Friend's True Self: Children and Their Concept of Personal Identity"
15:15 – 15:30	Coffee	
	G12	G13
15:30 – 16:15	Michael Sienhold and Kevin Reuter (Bern) "Is our concept of pain normative?"	Albert Newen (Bochum) "XXX"
16:15 – 17:00	Michael Sienhold (Bern) "It's not about the same pain: Why the pain-in-mouth argument fail?"	Dominic Ysidron and Andrew Monroe (Appalachian State) "Not so Motivated After All? Belief in Free Will is Not Uniquely Influenced By Immoral Events"
17:00 – 18:00	<i>Keynote</i> Elizabeth Spelke	
from 18:00	<i>Conference Dinner</i> (Venue tbc)	

Saturday, 16th June 2018		
G12		
10:00 - 11:00	<i>Keynote</i> Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh)	
11:00 – 11:15	Coffee	
	G12	G13
11:15 - 12:00	Michał Sikorski, Noah Dongen and Jan Sprenger (Turin University) <i>“Causal Strength, Tendency Causal Claims, and Indicative Conditionals”</i>	Aurélien Allard, Geoff Goodwin and Paulo Sousa (Paris, Pennsylvania, Belfast) <i>“Evaluating the centrality of communication for punishment”</i>
12:00 – 12:45	James Beebe and Greg Frost-Arnold (Buffalo) <i>“Multiply-Signifying Names in Ordinary Language”</i>	Paul Irikefe (Leuven) <i>“Virtuous Thought Experiments and the Negative Experimentalist Challenge”</i>
12:45 – 13:30	<i>Lunch Break</i>	
	G12	
13:30 – 14:30	<i>Keynote</i> Justin Sytsma (Wellington) “Experimental Philosophy of Pain”	

ABSTRACTS

TALKS

Thursday, 14th June 2018

13:05 - 14:00	<i>David Shanks</i> (UCL) “Is reproducible research on consciousness possible?”
14:00 – 15:00	<i>Deborah Mayo</i> (Virginia Tech)
15:30 - 16:15	<p><i>Samuel Fletcher</i> (Minnesota)</p> <p>“Some Foundational Considerations for Making Replication Mainstream.”</p> <p>Zwaan et al. (2017) have argued that direct replications of important experiments in psychology should be made a mainstream component of research in that field. Their argument draws on work in the philosophy of science, in particular Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (1970) and his “sophisticated falsificationism.”</p> <p>I am sympathetic to this conclusion, as I elaborate more below. However, on closer examination, I will argue, Lakatos’ historicist account of scientific rationality doesn’t support the necessity of replication in science in general, hence in psychology in particular, as the authors assert. There are essentially three reasons for this. First, replication is not possible in all sciences—see, e.g., macroeconomics and astrophysics—so cannot be an essential feature of science in general. Second, Lakatos’ proposal notoriously was unable to provide guidance on how many ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses were needed to make a research programme degenerate, rendering it normatively toothless. In the present context, this means that success or failure to replicate an important experiment cannot itself be indicative of a progressive or degenerate research programme, respectively. Third, Lakatos’ method inherits the inability of Popper’s falsificationism (1959) to handle properly statistical hypotheses, which according to the definition of falsification cannot in general be falsified. Although some (e.g., Gillies 1971) have attempted to repair this defect by using significance levels as falsification thresholds for statistical hypotheses, this only introduces an element of conventionality or subjectivity (depending on the details of implementation) inimical to the original goal of rationally grounding the importance of replication. Even without endorsing Lakatos, this difficulty arises from the variety of in general incompatible statistical methods for assessing whether a replication is successful.</p> <p>Despite these problems, I also argue that they can be overcome. First, one can propose that direct replication is important in psychology not because psychology is a science simpliciter, but because of the sort of science psychology is, or aspires to be—one that seeks to describe, explain, and predict stable patterns of human behavior and mental life rather than singular events. Second, it is helpful to distinguish between Lakatos’ accounts of scientific rationality at the meso- and macro-levels. I argue that replication can play a role in the former, which concerns how scientific communities adapt their theories to new evidence, without any endorsement of the latter, which concerns the evaluation of research programmes over time. Regarding the third concern, I distinguish between replication as an activity from replication as a designation of success, advocating only for the former. I agree with Zwaan et al. (2017) that replication as an activity should be mainstream in psychological science, but demur that it should focus on the question, “Has this experiment been replicated?” because of the unhelpful polysemy of the success term. Rather, one should ask, “What is the overall assessment of effect size from the experiment and its replications?” This shifts the focus from a coarse, binary criterion to the rich techniques of meta-analysis.</p>

<p>15:30 - 16:15</p>	<p><i>Ivar Hannikainen and Florian Cova (Rio de Janeiro, Geneva)</i></p> <p>“Does reflection underlie consequentialist attitudes across moral domains? A meta-analysis”</p> <p>In an influential study, participating in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) yielded greater utilitarian judgment in a set of sacrificial dilemmas (Paxton, Ungar & Greene, 2012). Furthermore, the number of right answers on the CRT was associated with greater utilitarian judgment as well, at least in one of two conditions. Purportedly, these results reveal that a reflective mindset promotes utilitarian reasoning in the moral domain. Paxton and colleagues’ (2012) finding, in retrospect, has played a critical role in the advancement of dual-process theories of moral judgment. And yet, attempts to replicate this finding directly have not always been successful (see e.g., Attie & Knobe, 2017), even with a large sample size and high statistical power. So, which is it: Are reflective people more utilitarian or not? In light of the dominance of dual-process theories in moral psychology, the failure to reproduce one of their core predictions should be a cause for concern. We sought to address this concern by compiling published and unpublished evidence concerning the relationship between utilitarianism and cognitive reflection. Our meta-analysis includes thirty-seven studies ($k = 37$; $N \approx 40,000$) employing individual difference measures of cognitive style (e.g., Need for Cognition, Cognitive Reflection Test) and moral judgment (e.g., sacrificial moral dilemmas, victimless crimes, Moral Foundations Questionnaire). The correlation between cognitive reflection and permissive attitudes toward utilitarian sacrifice appears to be small ($r \approx .10$), after accounting for publication bias. However, looking at a wider set of morality measures unrelated to sacrificial harm supports the broader claim that reflection underlies consequentialist values: For instance, reflective individuals are less likely to moralize harmless taboo violations ($r \approx .20$) or to view concerns unrelated to victim harm as foundations of morality ($r \approx .25$). Still, we find substantial heterogeneity in effect sizes across studies. Some, but not all, of the heterogeneity can be accounted for by year of data collection, gender distribution, and by the types of measures used (e.g., self-report versus performance; abstract values versus concrete judgments). Since many psychological effects are (a) small and (b) moderated by third variables in ways that are not easily anticipated, single replication attempts can often yield results that diverge significantly from more robust estimates of the population effect size. Progress on theoretical questions in experimental ethics is best pursued by examining both the overall replicability of a given finding and the causes of heterogeneity in effect sizes across studies.</p>
<p>16:15 – 17:00</p>	<p><i>Bartosz Maćkiewicz and Katarzyna Kuś (Warsaw)</i></p> <p>“What does it take to make your research reproducible and why should you care?”</p> <p>Computational reproducibility can be seen as a research standard which “requires that data sets and computer code to be made available to others for verifying published results and conducting alternative analyses” (Peng, 2009). It has mainly gained attention in the fields of computational sciences, biology, bioinformatics, physics and artificial intelligence. The reason for that is straightforward - these disciplines are computational-heavy and the ability to track precisely the flow of the data is of utmost importance when reliability and comparability of results is concerned. In psychology the idea of making your analysis reproducible in computational manner is not widely adopted. Nevertheless, together with openness of the data and pre-registration of experimental and statistical protocols, reproducibility is proposed as a manner to improve the quality of research in psychology. The need for such improvement was recently emphasized by so called “replicability crisis”.</p> <p>The main aim of our talk is to analyze the prospects for reproducibility in experimental philosophy. Small (but growing) community of experimental philosophers is in position to set an example and implement policies promoting computational reproducibility. It will require a</p>

	<p>change of mindset and an acquisition of new skills by the researchers but the potential gain in transparency of x-phil research cannot be overstated.</p> <p>In our talk we will show how to adopt good practices established in more computationally-oriented disciplines into experimental philosophy using open-source software, which ensures that reproducibility is not constrained by the access to expensive statistical suites. In other words, the goal is to achieve not only “theoretical” reproducibility but also real ability to perform data analysis by every interested researcher. Our work will demonstrate how to apply theoretical framework developed of reproducible research to experimental philosophy, taking into account specificity of modes of data collection and data analysis in typical x-phil research.</p> <p>As an example we will use our ongoing longitudinal study on sensitivity to philosophical intuitions to professional training. We will show how we developed a fully reproducible research pipeline for generating experimental reports, using such open-source tools as Git version control system, survey software SDAPS (for paper-based questionnaires) and LimeSurvey (for online questionnaires), R for statistical computing and RMarkdown for generating experimental reports.</p>
<p>16:15 – 17:00</p>	<p><i>Kevin Reuter (Bern)</i></p> <p>“What is a colleague?”</p> <p>Whereas we select our friends, we are largely at the mercy of luck when it comes to our colleagues. Ironically, many of us spend way more time in our lives with colleagues than with friends. Thus, the importance of having good relations with colleagues can hardly be overestimated. While the philosophical literature has become increasingly interested in the ethics of personal relationships, it has largely neglected the notion of collegiality – investigating which duties and rights people have in those relationships. This work is a theoretical and empirical investigation into the content and structure of our commonsense notion of colleague. It aims to answer two questions: First, what are the descriptive features that define what it means to be a colleague? Second, what are the normative aspects that are inherent in our conception of colleagues?</p>

Friday, 15th June 2018

10:00- 11:00	<p>Florian Cova (Geneva)</p>
11:00 – 11:45	<p><i>Noah van Dongen, Felipe Romero, Matteo Colombo Colombo and Jan Sprenger</i> (Turin, Tilburg, Groningen)</p> <p>“Meta-analysis of Semantic Intuition Research”</p> <p>At the beginning of the twenty-first century, experimental philosophy started to contribute to the debate on theories of reference through Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich’s seminal article “Semantics, cross-cultural style” (2004). Their empirical results indicated a difference in semantic intuitions between Western and East Asian people. However, this study failed to replicate during in a high-powered and preregister replication study that was part of the X-Phi Replication Project. On the other hand, some previous studies on cross-cultural differences in semantic intuitions do provide support for Machery et al’s (2004) original result. Existing literature, then, raises the questions: To what extent is the original result robust? To what extent does existing evidence support the hypothesis that East Asians are more likely than Westerners to have descriptivist judgments about the reference of proper names?</p> <p>In this talk, we present results of meta-analyses of the body of research on semantic intuitions to obtain a better understanding of the robustness of Machery et al’s (2004) finding in particular and of cross-cultural differences in semantic intuitions in general.</p>
11:00 – 11:45	<p><i>Miguel Vadillo, Natalie Gold and Magda Osman</i> (Madrid, Oxford, London)</p> <p>“Searching for the bottom of the ego well: Failure to uncover ego depletion in Many Labs 3”</p> <p>According to a popular model of self-control, willpower depends on a limited resource that can be depleted when we perform a task demanding self-control. Over the last five years, the reliability of the empirical evidence supporting this model has become the subject of heated debate. In the present study, we reanalysed data from a large-scale study –Many Labs 3– to test whether performing a depleting task has any effect on a secondary task that also relies on self-control. Although we used a large sample of more than 2,000 participants for our analyses, we did not find any significant evidence of ego-depletion: Persistence on an anagram solving task (a typical measure of self-control) was not affected by previous completion of a Stroop task (a typical depleting task in this literature). Our results suggest that persistence in anagram solving may not be an optimal measure to test depletion effects.</p>
11:45 - 12:30	<p><i>Ethan Landes</i> (St Andrews)</p> <p>“The Metalinguistics of the Intuition Debate</p> <p>Experimental philosophers, insofar as they use intuition-language, follow the stipulative usage of Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001). Under this usage of the term, a mental state is an intuition if it is a verdict to a thought experiment. This use of “intuition” has led a number of metaphilosophers to criticize and downplay findings in experimental philosophy (e.g., Cappelen, 2014; Ludwig, 2007, 2010) because, they argue, experimental philosophers’ use of “intuition” do not captures the philosophically important phenomena related to considering cases. More recently, metaphilosophers have used various strategies to sidestep the protracted disagreement about what intuitions are. These strategies include Deutsch’s (2015) ostensive “no-theory theory” account of intuitions, Andow’s (2016) “thin, fine, and with</p>

	<p>sensitivity account” meta-metaphilosophical framework constraining first-order accounts of intuitions, and pro-xphi intuition denial (Colaco & Machery, 2017), which denies experimental philosophy turns on intuitions at all.</p> <p>By drawing upon recent work in the conceptual engineering literature and related debates in metaontology, this talk defends a new way to understand the intuition debate and clear up the impasse between disputing parties in the intuition debate. I argue there is no single correct answer to what an intuition is. Rather, when used by metaphilosophers and experimental philosophers, “intuition” is ambiguous between three or more (possible or actual) properties of mental states that are in principle neither mutually exclusive nor mutually dependent.</p> <p>Plunkett and McPherson (in press) distinguishes between two sorts of concepts, folk concepts and theoretical concepts. Folk concepts are pre-theoretic concepts. Theoretical concepts are stipulated by people working in relevant areas of inquiry in order to do explanatory or predictive work the folk concept does not. For example, the folk concept of mass carried by non-specialists seems to be the force at which gravity pulls on an object. In contrast, physicists’ have different concepts of mass corresponding to different, but related, phenomena, including the generation of gravitational force and the amount of inertia carried by the object (Rindler, 2006, Ch1).</p> <p>The intuition debate, rather than being seen as an attempt to come to a correct account of what intuitions are, should instead be understood as different attempts at developing different theoretical concepts that pick out explanatorily important phenomena. By looking at the phenomena surrounding the method of cases, however, it is clear that there are multiple joints to capture, and different theorists have been picking out different phenomena. There is the typical phenomenology of having verdicts (Bealer, 1998; Chudnoff, 2013; Huemer, 2008; Koksvisk, 2017), the epistemic standing verdicts typically have (Grundmann, 2007; Ludwig, 2007), and the typical cognitive origin of those verdicts (Kornblith, 2013; Nagel, 2007). All three of these accounts pick out (potentially) distinct properties of (potentially) distinct mental states, and in principle, all three properties could coexist. It is a further question, however, whether they in fact do.</p> <p>When examining the properties of the mental states following an intuition, metaphilosophers should therefore not try to adjudicate between distinct account of what intuitions are. Rather, they should approach the metaphysics of intuitions ecumenically, cataloguing where the explanatorily important joints are—whether those joints are epistemic, phenomenological, cognitive, or something else—and studying how these different properties interact.</p>
<p>11:45 - 12:30</p>	<p><i>Eugen Fischer and Paul Engelhardt</i> (East Anglia)</p> <p>“Lingering Stereotypes and Automatic Inferences: Discovery and Conceptual Replication of a Salience Effect”</p> <p>We present converging evidence for the existence of a previously unrecognised salience bias that can affect philosophical argument. The evidence is from two recent studies that combine plausibility ratings with different psycholinguistic ‘online’ or process measures: pupillometry and reading times, respectively. In line with the conference theme, we use this example to reflect on the relevance of cross-methodological or ‘conceptual replication’.</p> <p>Verbal descriptions of possible cases figure in philosophical thought experiments and arguments. Philosophically relevant intuitions and inferences stand to be influenced by routine language processes, including stereotypical enrichment (Fischer & Engelhardt, 2016): When competent language users hear or read case descriptions, they automatically make a host of parallel inferences that ‘fill in’ the most specific stereotypes or situation schemas activated by the words used (Levinson, 2000). Polysemous words activate most rapidly and strongly the schemas associated with their most salient sense (Giora, 2003), where salience is a function of exposure frequency, modulated by prototypicality. Less salient uses are often interpreted by retaining that dominant schema and suppressing contextually inappropriate components</p>

	<p>(Giora et al., 2014). But frequently co-occurring components of a situation schema activate others (Hare et al. 2009, McRae et al. 2005), so irrelevant schema components cannot be completely suppressed while retaining relevant components. Irrelevant components that are only partially suppressed then support contextually inappropriate inferences. We therefore suggest a salience bias: Where polysemous words have a dominant sense, and less salient uses are interpreted with a retention strategy, such uses will trigger contextually inappropriate inferences which affect further judgment and reasoning.</p> <p>To garner evidence for this previously unrecognised cognitive bias and demonstrate its potential philosophical relevance, we examined contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from special uses of perception verbs, which have been suggested as the root of influential philosophical ‘arguments from hallucination’ (Fischer & Engelhardt, 2017). The talk presents two psycholinguistic studies. Pupillometry (Laeng et al. 2012) and reading time measurements (Rayner 1998) with eye tracking (Patson & Warren 2010) can be used to document automatic inferences; subsequent plausibility ratings can be used to assess the extent to which conclusions are suppressed or affect further cognition (Fischer & Engelhardt, 2017). Study 1 combines plausibility ratings with pupillometry. Study 2 combines plausibility ratings with reading-time measurements and regression counts (backwards eye movements). Both studies provide evidence that automatic inferences occur and affect further cognition even though participants know they are inappropriate (as demonstrated by a norming study).</p> <p>While eye tracking and further measures (e.g., ERPs) are widely used in psycholinguistics to study automatic inferences in language comprehension, the relationships between the different measures are not as well understood as one might wish (Clifton et al., 2007; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). In interpreting our results, we discuss the relevance of different reading time measures, and closest functional similarities between them and pupil dilations. This allows us to locate our studies on the spectrum from direct to conceptual replications (Stroebe & Strack, 2014), or replications to reproductions (Drummond 2009), and supports some more general conclusions concerning the robustness of philosophically relevant psycholinguistic findings about automatic inferences in language comprehension and production.</p>
<p>13:45 – 14:30</p>	<p>Kathryn Francis, Nat Hansen and Philip Beaman (University of Reading)</p> <p><i>“Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism”</i></p> <p>There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition (Stanley and Sripada 2012; Pinillos 2012; Pinillos and Simpson 2014; Buckwalter 2014; Rose et al. 2017). To date, stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses to “high stakes” cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties but are scalar and relative: whether a situation counts as “high” or “low” stakes is not an absolute property, it depends on what it’s being compared with (Kennedy and McNally 2005). So far, no experimental work has investigated the scalar and relative nature of stakes effects on knowledge: do stakes effects increase as the stakes get higher? Do stakes effects only appear once a certain threshold of stakes has been crossed? Does the effect plateau at a certain point? To address these questions, we conduct experiments that probe for the scalarity of stakes effects using several experimental approaches. Using a contextually-variable reference point, we evaluate whether an outcome counts as “high” or “low” stakes (in the same way that “tall” or “expensive” are relative to contextually variable comparison classes). In our first experiment, we ask participants to rate their level of agreement with claims that S knows that P or S doesn’t know that P. Across several epistemic scenarios that vary the type of stakes, from personal injury to reputation, we do not find evidence of the stakes effects on judgments about knowledge. However, in a second experiment, we adopt the evidence-seeking approach developed in Pinillos (2012) and Pinillos and Simpson (2014) that asks participants their opinion about how much evidence a subject needs to collect before she counts as knowing. Adopting this approach reveals a stakes effect across several scenarios and provides novel insights into the scalarity of these effects. These experiments provide a more fine-grained picture of the stakes effects on judgments about knowledge than has been possible in previous studies. By employing both</p>

	<p>positive and negative polarity versions of the evidence-seeking prompts, we also uncover and discuss a large framing effect on participants' willingness to say that a subject in a scenario never can know that something is the case, which has important consequences for how philosophers frame skeptical scenarios. Given the conflicting findings from traditional versus evidence-seeking approaches, we also present a set of experiments from a pre-registered replication project designed to determine the reliability and reproducibility of paradigms frequently adopted in experimental epistemology.</p>
<p>13:45 – 14:30</p>	<p>Vilius Dranseika (Vilnius)</p> <p><i>"On the Ambiguity of 'the Same Person'"</i></p> <p>It is quite common in the literature of psychology, experimental philosophy, neuroethics, and philosophy of psychiatry, to treat such phrases as "I am/she is still the same person" and "I am not/she is not the same person anymore" as indicating ascriptions of, respectively, continuity or disruption of identity. Ascriptions of continuity or disruption of identity on the basis of evaluation of short probes containing such phrases "still the same person" or "not the same person anymore," however, can be subject to ambiguities between different notions of identity. Sometimes it can be used in a numerical sense, and sometimes in some other sense of identity, such as qualitative identity, narrative identity, the persistence of true self, or the persistence of essential moral self. In this paper, I discuss one way how this potential for ambiguity of "the same person" can be addressed. Other languages than English can sometimes be better suited to disambiguate different senses of identity in a simple and economic manner. Take the distinction between numerical and qualitative readings of identity, for instance. In the English language "the same" can be used to express either of the two senses of identity and without larger context it can be difficult to interpret simple expressions containing "the same person." In Lithuanian, however, as in many other languages, there is a pair of phrases that can be used to contrast numerical identity with qualitative identity: <i>tas pats</i> and <i>toks pats</i>. I present results of seven studies (total N=1109), which collectively suggest that a number of empirical results in the current literature on personal identity suffer from failure to disambiguate between numerical and qualitative readings of identity.</p>
<p>14:30 – 15:15</p>	<p>Adrian Ziółkowski and Nathan Otteman (Warsaw, Leuven)</p> <p><i>"Are there non-factual facts?"</i></p> <p>We all want to know the 'facts', i.e. states of affairs that are not merely possible, but actually are (or were) the case. The term 'fact' holds a certain gravitas when used in discourse. In recent public debate it seems that the term 'fact' has been used in alternative ways. This observation has spurred on the curiosity to experiment on folk intuitions regarding the use of the term 'fact'.</p> <p>Experimental Philosophers have collected various data suggesting that intuitions expressed by non-philosophers are often at odds with philosophical tradition. For example, laypersons tend to accept some apparently non-factive uses of the verb 'know', i.e. they might agree with a claim, 'Agent A knows that p', even if 'p' expresses a false proposition (Buckwalter, 2014). Is it possible that people also accept non-factive uses of the term 'fact'? We surveyed over 650 people to test that suspicion.</p> <p>We designed few different vignettes (for the sake of illustration – one of the scenarios, "Sun and Earth", focused on the commonly held 15th century belief of geocentrism). The data collected undoubtedly shows that a similar phenomenon as found with the verb 'know' can be found in folk intuitions regarding the term 'fact'. Presented with a proper scenario, non-philosophers are likely to judge that a sentence of the form, 'It used to be a fact that p', is true even though the scenario clearly states that p was never the case. In the case of Sun and Earth vignette, we found that 73% of participants accept the claim 'It used to be a fact that the Sun rotated around Earth'. Similar results were obtained for other vignettes we used. Basing on these answers one could conclude that, according to the folk, there are non-factive facts. However, further investigation reveals that this phenomenon might only be apparent. When subjects were asked an additional paraphrasing question they no longer claimed that it really</p>

	<p>was a fact that p; but instead they chose an option suggesting that their initial intention was to say that p was believed to be a fact. In the scenario Sun and Earth, 89% of subjects answered that it was believed to be a fact that the Sun rotated around Earth, but it never was a fact (and 87% of those who initially agreed with the claim that it used to be a fact later switched to that answer option). Similar pattern was observed for other scenarios we tested. This could be described as an instance of protagonist projection within free indirect discourse and corresponds with Buckwalter's (2014) findings regarding other factive verbs including 'know'. Protagonist projection consists in answering questions concerning a given scenario from the epistemic standpoint of the protagonist in the scenario (Holton, 1997).</p> <p>This is an ongoing research project. We are planning to further investigate the scale and impact of protagonist projection. However, the results of our initial experiments already show that one should be cautious when interpreting survey answers provided by participants of x-phi studies. In some cases they shouldn't be taken literally. A proper interpretation might lower our worries about tensions between intuitions of the folk and those of professional philosophers</p>
<p>14:30 – 15:15</p>	<p>Michaela Košová and Robin Kopecký (Prague)</p> <p><i>"My Friend's True Self: Children and Their Concept of Personal Identity"</i></p> <p>This paper addresses recent research on children's concept of personal identity and its relation to moral traits and interpersonal relationships. It is inspired by earlier studies showing that there is a strong connection between the folk concept of personal identity and preference for moral traits with interpersonal connotations (the "essential moral self" hypothesis of Strohming & Nichols, 2014, 2015). Strohming, Knobe and Newman (2017) suggest that the "true self" of a person is generally viewed to be moral and inherently good. Also Tobia (2015, 2016) found that most respondents have higher tendency to agree that personal identity was broken after negative moral change than after positive moral change. These and other findings suggest that there is a connection between personal identity and positive interpersonal dispositions of a person in question.</p> <p>In order to explore these concepts also in developmental context we conducted an interview study in 2017 on Czech children and teenagers (N=217; 56,4% female; age range 6-15; average age=11). Respondents were randomly recruited at a public family event. Interviewer introduced each participant to a scenario in which a person ("your friend" (N=90), "someone you know" (N=36) or "some person" (N=91)) undergoes various changes after being closed in a special sci-fi chamber. Changes encompassed 6 categories: physical (appearance), cognitive (intelligence), moral (love for others, treatment of others), in character (laziness), in memory (remembering life experiences) and in perception (vision). Both negative and positive versions of the changes were included. Respondents were asked to judge how much each of the changes would affect the person's identity core on a 7-point scale (0-they are still the same person; 6-they are not the same person anymore).</p> <p>Data analyses showed that respondents consider moral traits to be significantly more important for personal identity preservation than any other category of traits. The next most important category is memory, followed by cognition, character and perception. Physical category remains far behind all the other categories.</p> <p>The expected difference between the impact of negative and positive versions of the changes was also supported by the data. The most salient difference came up in rating of the change in treatment of other people (becomes cruel vs. becomes nicer to other people). Also memory loss was rated considerably higher than the corresponding super-memory gain. On the other hand, negative and positive versions of the change in physical appearance (becomes uglier vs. becomes more beautiful) got almost equal rating.</p> <p>Further exploratory analyses revealed effects of age and scenario. Relative importance of moral traits grows with age, especially the distance between moral and physical category. Children responding to the personal scenario ("your friend/someone you know changes") ascribe higher importance to moral traits in comparison to other categories, than children responding to the neutral scenario.</p>

	<p>We can conclude that the “essential moral self” and the “true self” concepts seem to be present already in children and become more salient with age and in certain personal contexts (friendship). These findings again point to a strong conceptual connection between personal identity and its impact on the quality of interpersonal relationships.</p>
<p>15:30 – 16:15</p>	<p>Michael Sienhold and Kevin Reuter (Bern)</p> <p><i>“Is our concept of pain normative?”</i></p> <p>In the philosophical literature on pain, a distinction is made between the attribution of the physical source of a pain and that of a phenomenal pain experience, and it is argued that this distinction is characteristic of the commonsense concept of pain. To what extent it is in fact characteristic of our concept of pain, is, however, an open question. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence inof the view that we think of the pain’s physical source and its phenomenal experience as more interrelated than one might intuitively suggest: The difference greasy food or cancer was highly significant, although the description of the phenomenal aspect and pain behavior was completely identical in both cases. One way to account for these results is by positing that people think about pain normatively. Accordingly, a person should have less pain in a less severe situation. In order to investigate this possibility, we conducted a second study in which participants rated the appropriateness of pain in three different situations: torn ligaments, a strained ligament or no injury at all. Even though the severity of the cause of pain was fundamentally different, the respondents did not consider the pain as significantly more or less appropriate. In contrast to other concepts, e.g., happiness, intentionality, cause, it seems that the concept of pain falls outside the realm of rationality</p>
<p>15:30 – 16:15</p>	<p>Albert Newen (Bochum)</p> <p>“XXX</p>
<p>16:15 – 17:00</p>	<p>Michael Sienhold (Bern)</p> <p><i>“It’s not about the same pain: Why the pain-in-mouth argument fail?”</i></p> <p>In the philosophy of pain, the following argument is discussed: There is a pain in my fingertip; The fingertip is in my mouth; Therefore, there is a pain in my mouth. While the failure of the argument itself is fairly undisputed, the reason for the failure is all the more controversial. For Ned Block, its failure is due to two different types of 'in', while Michael Tye claims that 'pain' creates an intensional context. Paul Noordhof makes a third proposal and states that the first premise and the conclusion are about two different pains. I agree with his proposal and provide the following empirical evidence. Subjects were asked to rate the conclusion of one of eight allegedly analogous and disanalogous arguments. These arguments were designed to fit each of the eight ways of combining the three factors mentioned (two types of 'in', intensional context, two different objects/phenomena). The results speak for Noordhof’s and my position, because varying the identity of the reference object or phenomenon had by far the greatest influence on how participants agreed with the conclusion. Contrary to Tye, the occurrence of an intensional context had no significant influence on people’s rejection of the conclusion. Contrary to Block, the occurrence of two types of 'in' was neither necessary nor sufficient for people’s rejection of the conclusion.</p>
<p>16:15 – 17:00</p>	<p>Dominic Ysidron and Andrew Monroe (Appalachian State)</p> <p><i>“Not so Motivated After All? Belief in Free Will is Not Uniquely Influenced By Immoral Events”</i></p> <p>Free will is a foundational issue for questions pertaining to moral responsibility, praise, and blame. Scholarly research on free will has grown exponentially in the past decade as philosophers, joined by psychologists, explored how people’s belief in free will affects moral behavior and moral judgment. Recently, however, some researchers sought to turn this</p>

<p>research on its head, and proposed that people's belief in free will is motivated by moral judgments and a desire to blame (Clark et al., 2014). If true, this would represent a coup for free will research; however, the present work suggests that there are methodological and theoretical reasons to doubt such an account.</p> <p>We present four, preregistered experiments testing two key claims: First, at a methodological level, we argue that assertions of motivated free will beliefs are based on a free will measure that confounds free will belief and moral judgments (the FAD+, Paulhus & Carey, 2011). Second, at a theoretical level, we argue that norm violations, not immorality, better explain people's shifting free will judgments.</p> <p>In Study 1 (n = 400) and Study 2a (n = 401), we conducted exact replications of Clark et al.'s (2014) Studies 1 and 2, respectively. Study 2b (n = 399) was a close replication of Clark et al. (2014), Study 2, but used a different sample population. In these Studies, people were randomly assigned to read about either an agent who committed an immoral act (imprisoning children, robbing a house) or a neutral act (hiring a new employee, picking up cans for recycling). Afterwards, people reported their general belief in free will (using the FAD+) and their agent-specific free will judgments. The results of each of these studies demonstrated a consistent inability to replicate Clark et al.'s original findings. Surprisingly, this was true, not only when we disentangled moral judgments from free will judgments, but also when using the full FAD+ scale as Clark et al. (2014) did.</p> <p>In Study 4 (n = 800) we conducted a novel experiment in which we test an alternative – norm violation – theoretical account for motivated free will beliefs. In this experiment, participants read about one of four behaviors: blameworthy, praiseworthy, morally neutral, and morally-neutral-but-strange behaviors. Afterwards, participant reported their general belief in free will and their agent-specific free will judgments. Results demonstrated that people judged agents to have more free will in all of the norm violation conditions (blameworthy, praiseworthy, and morally-neutral-but-strange) compared to control, and people did not differentiate between blameworthy behaviors and the other norm violating conditions. These results suggest that immoral behaviors do not uniquely influence free will beliefs. Norm deviations, of any kind—good, bad, or strange—increase attributions of free will.</p> <p>Together, our data suggest that people's belief in free will is not so motivated after all. Three preregistered, well-powered studies challenge the replicability of the original motivated free will belief findings, and Study 4 challenges the theory that immorality, specifically, intensifies free will beliefs.</p>
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Saturday, 16th June 2018

10:00-11:00	Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh)
11:15 – 12:00	<p>Michał Sikorski, Noah Dongen and Jan Sprenger (Turin University)</p> <p><i>“Causal Strength, Tendency Causal Claims, and Indicative Conditionals”</i></p> <p>The relations between conditionals and causal claims received a lot attention in philosophy. For example, Lewis, 1973 argues that there is a true counterfactual conditional, with arguments describing actual events, corresponding to every true causal claim. There are also many experiments devoted to conditionals (see Douven, 2016) and causal claims (e.g., Sloman and Lagnado, 2015). However, there are no experiments devoted to testing their expected relation directly. We explore this relation empirically and take steps in advancing the philosophical debate on conditionals via sound experimental research.</p>
11:15 – 12:00	<p>Aurélien Allard, Geoff Goodwin and Paulo Sousa (Paris, Pennsylvania, Belfast)</p> <p><i>“Evaluating the centrality of communication for punishment”</i></p> <p>What constitutes a fair punishment? Traditional philosophical debates have focused on two rival theories for the justification of punishment, the retributive and deterrence theories. This talk will focus on the empirical evaluation of a third theory, the communicative theory of punishment, which has been the focus of renewed attention since the 1970s and 1980s. According to the communicative theory of punishment, the legitimacy of punishment stems from the fact that it communicates the punisher’s disapproval to the punished person, with possible educational consequences (Hirsch, 1994; Duff, 2000). Proponents of the communicative theory of punishment have specifically appealed to the fact that this theory is already embedded in actual punitive practices (Duff, 2000). It remains unclear, however, whether the communicative theory of punishment corresponds to common ideas about punishment.</p> <p>Prior psychological research has shown that retributive factors are dominant in judging the fairness of punishment, and that people seem mainly motivated by the idea of giving back evil for evil (e.g., Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 2000). It still remains unclear whether further factors also play a role, or whether the popular psychology of punishment is entirely retributive (what has been dubbed “brute retributivism” by Nichols, 2013). While the idea that punishment is meant as a means of communication might seem plausible, recent work by Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2013) has cast doubt on this account. Using economic games, they failed to find any difference in the motivation to punish a wrongdoer among conditions where communication was possible compared to conditions where communication was impossible. Drawing on Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2013), we will present two experiments probing whether people do take communication into account when evaluating punishment. In study 1, using vignettes comparing punishment occurring with or without communication, participants were probed about the prototypicality of non-communicative vs communicative punishments. In study 2, we assessed the robustness of Nadelhoffer and colleagues’ results, using a bigger sample size (N = 220 compared to N = 74 in the original study), a within-subject design, and different instructions making clearer the lack of communication in the no-communication condition. Participants were asked to express willingness to punish in two situations, one in which one possible punished person was aware of the punishing, and one in which she wasn’t. In study 1 and 2, participants judged that a harmful action which involved communication was closer to a prototypical punishment, and said that they would be more likely to punish if punishment involved the possibility of sending a message. Both results thus suggest that communication is an important part of the concept of punishment and constitutes a part of the motivation to punish. Both experiments were pre-registered, and data and materials will be made public on the Open Science Framework.</p>

<p>12:00 – 12:45</p>	<p>James Beebe and Greg Frost-Arnold (Buffalo)</p> <p><i>“Multiply-Signifying Names in Ordinary Language”</i></p> <p>Multiply-signifying names signify more than one entity. Carnap (1957) maintained that any putative name that is associated with more than one object in a relevant universe of discourse fails to be a genuine name. Although many philosophers have agreed with Carnap, they have not always agreed among themselves about whether atomic sentences containing such terms should be deemed false or neither true nor false. Field (1973) maintained that multiply-signifying names can still refer, albeit partially or confusedly, and offered a supervenient account of their semantic properties. Other perspectives that allow sentences containing multiply-signifying names to be true have been articulated in the literature. After outlining many of the most important theoretical considerations for and against various semantic theories for multiply-signifying names, we report the results of a study designed to investigate which of these accounts best accords with the truth-value judgments of ordinary language users about sentences containing these terms. We found that naïve participants view multiply-signifying names as capable of successfully referring to one or more objects. Thus, semantic theories that judge them to involve complete reference failure do not comport well with patterns of ordinary usage.</p>
<p>12:00 – 12:45</p>	<p>Paul Irikefe (Leuven)</p> <p><i>“Virtuous Thought Experiments and the Negative Experimentalist Challenge”</i></p> <p>The movement of negative experimental philosophy (a.k.a. xphi) has been conducting wide-ranging empirical studies on the intuitive verdicts of philosophical thought experiments by undergraduates drawn from various socio-cultural and economic backgrounds. They argue that their results show that intuition varies along truth-irrelevant factors, which makes philosophical practices in analytic philosophy that rely on these intuitive verdicts suspect (Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001, Machery et al. 2004, and Swain et al. 2008). Call this the arbitrariness challenge. A foremost problem in contemporary analytic philosophy is how to respond to the arbitrariness challenge, in a way that does justice to how philosophers actually ply their trade. This is important because confusion about philosophical methodology leads to scepticism about philosophical conclusions.</p> <p>The responses to the arbitrariness challenge have distilled along two wings: the radical wing and the conservative wing. According to the radical wing, most philosophers have been mistaken in their practice of philosophy and their understanding of philosophical practices in general. The no-intuition reply of Deutsch (2015) and Cappelen (2012, 2014) exemplifies this. The conservative wing on the other hand insists that philosophers are not wrong in their practice of relying on intuition to argue for philosophical positions. It is the negative experimentalists who have been wrong in their understanding of these practices. The expertise reply of Devitt (2011, 2012), Hale (2006), and Ludwig (2007), and the multiple-concept reply of Sosa (2010) exemplify this.</p> <p>The goal of this paper is to show that a more adequate response to the arbitrariness challenge is to focus on the functional conditions of successful thought experiments. On this basis, I will argue that thought experiments do not have free-standing results, and that both the negative xphi and the radical wing are mistaken in their understanding of thought experiments and their evidential force. If minimal reflective skills and good stage-setting are components of successful thought experiments, then using these thought experiments to canvass the intuitions of rushers-by and undergraduates undermines the evidential force of the arbitrariness challenge.</p> <p>The paper shall be divided into three parts. In the first part, we motivate an alternative conservative approach to the arbitrariness challenge by showing that the radical wing represented by the no-intuition reply of Deutsch (2015) is a self-defeating approach. Also, a line of interpretation is given to the multiple-concept reply in which it is a variation of the expertise reply. In the second part, we begin to sketch an account of philosophical thought experiments that shifts the paradigm from structural considerations to functional considerations. The emerging picture places virtuous intuition as a constitutive element of</p>

	<p>thought experiment evidence. In the third part, this class of intuition and the functional insight about thought experiments are used to dissolve the arbitrariness challenge. The conclusion pulls the strings of the discussion together by noting that this response vindicates the expertise reply and gives the conservative wing an upper hand in the debate.</p>
<p>13:30 – 14:30</p>	<p><i>Keynote</i> Justin Sytsma “Experimental Philosophy of Pain”</p> <p>Worries about replicability often focus on exact (or approximate) replication. While this is, of course, important, it is not the only type of replication that we should be concerned with. At least as important, is conceptual replication—testing our hypotheses in a variety of ways and using a range of methods. I will illustrate by discussing recent work on folk theories of pain. The standard view of pains among philosophers today is that their existence consists in being experienced. The typical line of support offered for this view is that it corresponds with the ordinary or commonsense conception of pain. Despite this, a growing body of evidence indicates that the ordinary understanding of pain stands in contrast to the standard view among philosophers. In this talk, I’ll present a wide range of results on the ordinary understanding of pain. While these studies come at the issue from a variety of angles, I argue that the findings point in the same direction, providing a consilience of evidence for the hypothesis that the dominant understanding of pain among lay people diverges notably from the standard view in philosophy.</p>

	ABSTRACTS
	POSTER
1	<p>Cara Maritz (John Hopkins)</p> <p><i>“Experimental Philosophy of Language: A Methodological Review”</i></p> <p>One of the most important shifts within experimental philosophy has been the characterization of the field as a branch of cognitive science. In this talk, I explore the relationship between experimental philosophy of language and contemporary research in linguistics, specifically regarding intuitions about reference.</p> <p>I consider the respective research approach associated with what is typically referred to as the ‘negative’ program. I argue that there are two possible avenues an experimental philosopher of language may decide to adopt in search of a scientific explanation of referential intuitions – a social psychology approach, or a cognitive science approach. Choosing between these two approaches depends on the level of analysis chosen, and I argue that this has important consequences for the negative program depending on which level of analysis is privileged.</p> <p>To illustrate this difference, I draw upon related empirical work that exemplifies the different methodological approaches. While both levels constitute a broadly ‘cognitive explanation’ of culture, language, and the mind, they ultimately entail radically different empirical projects for an experimental philosopher of language. There are at least two methodological problems that arise from the adoption of these very different approaches.</p> <p>After reviewing these problems, I concentrate on a cognitive science approach and conclude that a thoroughly naturalized study of referential intuitions sits at odds with current research in linguistics. This tension is illustrated through surveying recent developments in the mass/count noun distinction and the acquisition of scope ordering.</p>
2	<p>Philipp Schönegger and Johannes Wagner (Graz):</p> <p><i>“The Moral Behaviour of Ethics Professors: Relationships among Expressed Normative Attitude and Self-Reported Behaviour. A Replication-Extension in German-Speaking Countries”</i></p> <p>What is the relation between ethical reflection and moral behaviour? Does professional reflection on ethical issues positively impact moral behaviour? Schwitzgebel and Rust (2014) addressed these questions by empirically investigating if philosophy professors engaged with ethics professionally behave, on average, any morally better, or at least more consistently with their expressed values, than do non-ethicist professors with otherwise comparable academic background. Results from Schwitzgebel and Rust's US-based sample indicate that neither is the case, thereby suggesting that there might be no straightforwardly positive influence of ethical reflection on moral behaviour. In our study, we aim to cross-validate their US-based findings by conducting a replication attempt of their original study in the German-speaking world.</p> <p>More specifically, we aim to replicate Schwitzgebel and Rust's main finding, according to which ethicists expressed more pronounced normative attitudes towards some moral issues such as vegetarianism and charity, while showing no significant difference in self-reported moral behaviour compared to non-ethics philosophers and non-philosophy professors. Like the original study, we examine and compare the expressed normative attitudes and self-reported moral behaviour of ethicists and two non-ethicists control groups. We will survey 395 ethics professors, 506 philosophy professors and 521 non-philosophy professors from 56 German-speaking universities from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland for their normative assessment and moral behaviour on eight moral issues, ranging from stealing to vegetarianism to organ donation. While a replication attempt in another culture introduces</p>

	<p>cultural and linguistic confounds and thus makes it difficult to interpret non-replication, a successful replication of effects has higher confirmatory validity exactly because of being conducted in circumstances that differ in relevant dimensions of interest. To balance this trade-off, we strictly modelled our research design in all aspects after Schwitzgebel and Rust (2014), unless this was impossible due to cultural or institutional reasons like differing election systems or varying legal structures.</p> <p>While we leave the body of the survey as unchanged as possible, we extend Schwitzgebel and Rust's list of questions by a) asking for an assessment of reasons internalism/externalism (without utilising these technical terms), as well as b) for the relation between moral reflection, ethical truths, and moral behaviour. As for the former, asking participants for how they themselves conceive of the relation between moral reasons and moral motivation might, for instance, help explain the gap between ethicists' self-reported normative attitude and behaviour that Schwitzgebel and Rust originally observed. As for the latter, we thought it to be potentially illuminating to obtain participants' explicit take on the relations of philosophical moral reflection to moral truths and moral behaviour respectively, as these relations are our basic research questions.</p> <p>Generally, social psychology and adjacent fields like experimental philosophy suffer from a lack of replication studies, openness and transparency (Schmidt 2009, p. 99). We therefore preregistered the study in the Open Science Framework and intend to contribute to the ideal of a cumulative science with this replication-extension attempt.</p>
3	<p>Tobias Koch (Bochum)</p> <p><i>"Don't Tell Me Stories!"</i></p> <p><i>Experimental philosophy has come under attack, fielded for instance by Kauppinen (2007), Cullen (2010) and Royzman and Hagan (2017), from a pragmatic enrichment point of view. The argument goes: recipients of vignettes as used in studies of experimental philosophy rely for their interpretation of the stimulus not only on the information explicitly given in the text, but adduce contextual, i.e. purely pragmatic information, just as well. Therefore it is hard to ensure that subjects uniformly interpret vignettes in the intended way.</i></p> <p><i>I argue that not only do we have to worry on pragmatic grounds, but that the problem of unintended interpretation already arises on a semantic level. That is, I will argue that even if participants do not take into account anything but what is explicitly stated in the vignette and take it at face value, they may very well fail to represent the stimulus in the intended way.</i></p> <p><i>In a first step, I argue that all experimental philosophy is in one way or another about uncovering which concepts the folk have, that is experimental philosophy can broadly be understood as folk conceptual analysis. A conceptual analysis consists of an analysandum, the concept to be analyzed, and an analysans, the concepts proposes as its analysis. To test whether the folk agree with a certain analysis of C, say as C1 to Cn, the experimental philosopher has to operationalize C1 to Cn as independent variables. She does that not by mentioning C1 to Cn explicitly, but by telling short narratives – the vignettes – in which C1 through Cn are exemplified, to bar laypeople from having to unravel unwieldy philosophical vocabulary. In other words: she translates "C1 to Cn", say as "C*" and requires of the participant of her study to infer from "C*" that what is actually referred to are C1 to Cn. However, the participant might rest with the literal interpretation of "C*" and thus fail to see its intended meaning. If that happens, the participant's answer to the dependent measure are not at all indicative of whether he agrees with the analysis in question or not.</i></p> <p><i>Presented like this the concern looks pretty theoretical. So I go on to show in a case study of one particular vignette, the one used in Turri's (2013) study on Gettier intuitions, how such a mismatch can arise between the intended meaning of what is explicitly stated in the stimulus – the everyday translation of the analysans – and the subjects' representation thereof, and identify several sources such an unintended interpretation can have. In a last part, I discuss ways of spotting and preventing such interpretations</i></p>

	<p><i>and come to the conclusion that only manipulation check questions can single out misunderstandings. If concept C was supposed to be read into the vignette, then such a question has roughly the following form: “Was X in the story you just read C?”, where “X” refers to some object mentioned in the vignette. I conclude that such questions can only do their job if “C” itself is not too theoretical a term since otherwise in order to ensure that subjects understand what they are asked for one had to resort to translation again, thereby falling prey to the same objection as before. This arguably limits the purview of experimental philosophy to the study of conceptual analyses that do not involve concepts in their analysans which are too theoretical for laypeople to understand unmediated reference to them.</i></p>
4	<p>Neele Engelmann (Göttingen)</p> <p><i>“The Interaction between Causality, Foreseeability, and Outcome Valence in Attributions of Moral Responsibility</i></p> <p>Most theories of moral judgments distinguish between acts and outcomes. According to these theories, moral judgments are either primarily based on the evaluation of acts or outcomes, with multi-system theories allowing for both possibilities. Drawing from nonconsequentialist philosophy, our research program is based on the assumption that it is not only the acts and outcomes that determine moral evaluations but also the causal relations linking the acts with their outcomes and the mental representation of these relations (e.g., foreseeability, intentions). Previous research on moral dilemmas has provided initial evidence for the claim that moral judgments are subtly influenced by causal and intentional variations despite the fact that the initial acts and the final outcomes were kept constant (see Waldmann, Wiegmann, & Nagel, 2017). In the present study we focus on more elementary morally relevant actions to investigate in greater detail how the attribution of moral responsibility depends on causal structure, foreseeability, and type of outcome. In an online experiment, we presented 290 participants with vignettes about agents performing various actions (e.g., conducting chemicals into a lake; taking medication while pregnant; exchanging parts of a car engine). In all scenarios, either a positive or a negative outcome occurred. Crucially, we varied whether the outcome was caused by the agent’s action or by alternative factors beyond the agent’s control. In addition, we manipulated whether agents knew that the effect was likely to result from their actions or not. As expected, responsibility attributions to the agents were higher when the action was causal than when the outcome was caused by external factors. Likewise, foreseeability of the outcome tended to increase attributions of responsibility. Strikingly, there was also an unexpected interaction between causality and the valence of the outcome. When the agent’s action was described as the cause of the outcome, higher responsibility ratings were observed for negative than for positive outcomes. However, when the agent’s action was not causally connected to the outcome, responsibility ratings, although generally low, were higher for positive than for negative outcomes. While the moral psychology literature lists several effects of outcome properties on different kinds of judgments (e.g., moral luck, hindsight bias, outcome bias), this particular interaction between causality and outcome valence has not been reported yet. Possible explanations linking the effect to other outcome effects are discussed. We plan to conduct follow-up studies to pinpoint these intriguing effects in the near future.</p>
5	<p>Simon Stephan, Neele Engelmann and Lara Kirfel (Göttingen, UCL)</p> <p><i>“The influence of learned statistical abnormality on singular causation judgments.”</i></p> <p>Does the extent to which we regard certain events as “normal” or “abnormal” influence our judgments about their causal influence on other events? Ever since Knobe and Fraser (2008) and Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) reported a series of findings seemingly demonstrating that a moral judgment about an action can sometimes alter how much we find it to be a cause of an outcome, there has been considerable debate about the relationship between causality and</p>

	<p>“normality”.</p> <p>Recently Icard, Kominsky, and Knobe (2017) developed a formal framework specifying the way in which both prescriptive normality (i.e., whether an event or action is morally good or bad) and statistical normality (i.e., whether an event or action is frequent or rare) could play a role in the generation of singular causation judgments. However, as is true of all other studies that have investigated the influence of norms on causal judgments, the evidence they present rests exclusively on vignette studies. To date, not a single study has been conducted investigating whether the influence of normality on singular causation judgments persists when reasoners learn the relevant parameters from experience. There is thus the possibility that normality effects are susceptible to the so-called description-experience gap. We thus conducted a conceptual replication of one of the effects, “Abnormal Deflation”, reported by Icard et al. (2017) using a causal learning paradigm instead of vignettes. “Abnormal Deflation” refers to the phenomenon that in cases where an outcome is overdetermined by two causal factors (i.e., either cause on its own would have been sufficient for the outcome to occur), an abnormal cause should receive lower ratings of actual causation than a more normal cause. We presented participants with a scenario about a newly found type of desert flower that changes its colour when exposed to certain minerals. We first had participants work on a standard elemental causal induction task in which they learned the causal strengths of the two minerals. Subjects learned that either mineral always causes colour changes. In a subsequent task, we had subjects observe how often the two minerals occur in the plants. We varied whether both minerals have equal (control) or different (test case) probabilities to be found in plants. This variation of the base rates was our manipulation of normality. Manipulation check questions revealed that subjects adequately learned both the minerals’ causal powers as well as their base rates.</p> <p>As a test case we showed participants a single flower that had been exposed to both minerals and that changed its colour. We then asked them to express their agreement to the claims that either mineral had caused the flower to change its colour. As predicted by the model of Icard et al. (2017) we replicated the “Abnormal Deflation” effect: in the condition with unequal base rates, subjects gave lower ratings for the mineral associated with a lower base rate. Until now, the influence of normality on causal judgments has been exclusively shown in experiments with descriptive vignettes. Our findings provide first evidence that statistical normality also influences causal judgements when both the causal strength as well as the statistical normality of the causal candidates are learned.</p>
6	<p>Nick Axten (Bristol)</p> <p>“Measuring Publication Bias in Psychology: Some Early Research”</p> <p>Some recent commentary on the effect of publication bias in the reproducibility crisis appears to suggest that it is a relatively new problem and that it arises largely from methodological errors of researchers and/or misinterpretation of statistical evidence by readers. I argue that it is not new and it is a fundamental technical problem inherent in Fisher’s methodology as applied to non-uniformly disseminated statistical results. Hence it is not essentially a problem of research ethics, nor can it be solved, if at all, by regulation, exhortation or education.</p> <p>After briefly surveying some recent attempts to detect, estimate and correct for publication bias I describe an unpublished research project conducted at the University of Leeds in 1970 to detect and estimate publication bias in what was then recently published psychological research. This study involved:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) finding pairs of published studies measuring the same statistical effect using different sample sizes; b) standardizing reported sizes of effect by converting to Fisher’s \bar{z} ; c) standardizing sample sizes by converting to $1/\sqrt{N}$; d) testing the set of pairwise relationships between \bar{z} and $1/\sqrt{N}$; e) testing the fit of the results to various models of possible publication bias. <p>From a recent review of the literature, the project described appears to be unique. Though small, it showed very strong evidence of publication bias, at $p < 0.005$, and suggests that this</p>

	<p>bias is sufficiently large to undermine standard judgements of statistical significance. I discuss some implications concerning the role of statistical analysis in scientific research.</p>
7	<p>Robin Kopecký and Michaela Košová (Prague)</p> <p>“How virtue signalling makes us better: Moral preference of selection of types of autonomous vehicles”</p> <p>In this paper, we present a study on moral judgement on autonomous vehicles (AV). We employ a hypothetical choice of three types of “moral” software in a collision situation (“selfish”, “altruistic”, and “aversive to harm”) in order to investigate moral judgement beyond this social dilemma in the Czech population we aim to answer two research questions: Whether the public circumstances (i.e. if the software choice is visible at the first glance) make the personal choice “altruistic” and what type of situation is most problematic for the “altruistic” choice (namely if it is the public one, the personal one, or the one for a person’s offspring). We devised a web-based study running between May and December of 2017 and gathered 2769 respondents (1799 women, 970 men; age IQR: 25-32). This study was a part of research preregistered at OSF before start of data gathering.</p> <p>The AV-focused block of the questionnaire was opened by a brief information on AV and three proposed program solutions for previously introduced “trolley problem like” collisions: “selfish” (with preference for passengers in the car), “altruistic” (with preference for the highest number of saved lives), and “aversion to harm” (which will not actively change direction leading to killing a pedestrian or a passenger, even though it would save more lives in total). Participants were asked the following four questions: 1. What type of software would you choose for your own car if nobody was able to find out about your choice (“secret/self”). 2. What type of software would you choose for your own car if your choice was visible at the first glance (“public/self”). 3. What type of software would you choose for the car of your beloved child if nobody was able to find out (“child”). 4. What type of software would you vote for in secret in the parliament if it was to become the only legal type of AV (“parliament”).</p> <p>The results are as follows, test of independence was performed by a chi square: “Secret/self”: “selfish” (45.2 %), “altruistic” (45.2 %), “aversion to harm” (9.6 %). “public/self”: “selfish” (30 %), “altruistic” (58.1 %), “aversion to harm” (11.8 %). In public choice, people were less likely to choose selfish software for their own car.</p> <p>“Child”: “selfish” (66.6 %), “altruistic” (27.9 %), “aversion to harm” (5.6 %). A vote in parliament for legalizing single type: “selfish” (20.6 %), “altruistic” (66.9 %), “aversion to harm” (12.5 %) In choice of car for one’s own child people were more likely to choose selfish software than in the choice for themselves.</p> <p>Based on the results, we can conclude that the public choice is more likely to pressure consumers to accept the altruistic solution making it a reasonable and relatively cheap way to shift them towards higher morality. In less favourable news, the general public tends to heightened sensibility and selfishness in case of one’s own offspring, and a careful approach is needed to prevent moral panic.</p>
8	<p>Su Wu and Junwei Huang (Reading): “<i>Cross-field Differences in Philosophical Expertise</i>”</p> <p>Experimental philosophers have found that our intuitions about philosophical thought experiments could vary among people with different backgrounds (Weinberg et al., 2001; Machery et al., 2004) and that intuitions are sensitive to unexpected factors such as the order of presentation of cases (Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996; Swain et al., 2008) and participants’ personality traits (Feltz & Cokely, 2009). Since intuitions have played a central role in philosophical study, such results could pose a severe challenge to the reliability of philosophical methodology.</p> <p>In response to this challenge, defenders of armchair philosophy have argued that intuitions from ordinary people collected by experimental philosophers are not philosophically relevant. From their perspective, people lacking philosophical training are incapable of understanding complicated philosophical scenarios, let alone having intuitions which can serve as evidence for or against philosophical theories. Thus, finding a variety of intuitive responses from</p>

	<p>ordinary people poses no threat to traditional armchair methods which rely only on intuitions from well-trained philosophers (Hales, 2009; Kornblith, 2007; Ludwig, 2007). This is the so called 'expertise defense'. Unfortunately, follow-up experiments suggest that even intuitions from philosophers vary in ways similar to ordinary people (Schulz et al., 2011, Tobia et al., 2013; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2015).</p> <p>So far, most of those follow-up experiments have only focused on ethical examples. But some experimental philosophers have observed that there is no reason to expect that philosophers should be expected do any better in other fields in philosophy (Machery, 2015).</p> <p>In this paper, we argue that we have reasons to reject the generalization. Specifically, we argue that there could be cross-field differences in philosophical expertise.</p> <p>First of all, some results from experimental philosophy in other fields, such as epistemology, imply that specific philosophical intuitions from people with philosophical training could be generally trustworthy. For example, one study found that students who had taken more philosophy courses were more likely to share skeptical intuitions (Nichols et al., 2003). Turri's (2013) experiments on Gettier case also revealed that philosophers may have some relevant expertise when considering epistemological thought experiments. And an experiment in epistemology showed that philosophers were much less inclined to treat a correct guess as knowledge (Horvath & Wiegmann, 2016). We replicated this result with Chinese participants in our study.</p> <p>Secondly, the need to reflect on thought experiments could be different in various fields. A correlation between CRT (Cognitive Reflection Test) scores was not found in study on compatibilism (Schulz et al., 2011) but found in a cross-cultural experiment on epistemology The Gettier, for example (Machery et al., 2017). Additionally, a negative correlation between CRT scores and knowledge attribution in correct guess cases was found in our study as well. This difference may explain why philosophers, who usually scored high in CRT (Livengood et al., 2010), showed no superiority in some experiments. And this also hints that some fields may be better for demonstrating the role of philosophical expertise in response to thought experiments than others.</p> <p>Last but not least, intuitions triggered by philosophical scenarios may correlate with multiple cognitive processes. Dissociability among those cognitive processes related to various intuitions were widely found in psychology and cognitive science (Nado, 2013), which strongly suggests that the unreliability found in certain kinds of intuition cannot be easily generalized to others.</p> <p>We conclude that drawing finer distinctions between subject matter is required if we want to understand the role played by philosophical expertise in response to thought experiments</p>
9	<p>Francesca Bonalumi, Margherita Isella and John Michael (CEU, Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Warwick): <i>"Cueing Implicit Commitment."</i></p> <p>The phenomenon of commitment is a cornerstone of human social life. Commitments make individuals' behavior predictable in the face of fluctuations in their desires and interests, thereby facilitating the planning and coordination of joint actions involving multiple agents. As such, the origin and stability of everyday social exchanges and institutions such as marriage, scientific collaboration, and employment depend upon the credibility of commitments. Despite the importance of commitment for distinctively human forms of sociality, it remains unclear how people identify, prioritize and assess their own and others' commitments. This is especially true for cases in which a sense of commitment arises in the absence of any explicit agreements. In addressing this question, Michael, Sebanz & Knoblich (2016) recently hypothesized that people's judgments and attitudes about implicit commitments are governed by an implicit sense of commitment, which is modulated by various cues that another agent expects one to perform a particular action and may have invested effort or other costs on the basis of that expectation. In a battery of experiments conducted using M-Turk, we tested this hypothesis by presenting participants with vignettes describing everyday situations in which an</p>

	<p>implicit commitment between two agents was violated, and asked participants to judge to what extent an apology was in order, and to what extent they would be annoyed if the offending agent did not offer them an apology in such a situation. We manipulated the extent to which the offending agent had been expected to honor the implicit commitment (by manipulating how many times they had done so in the past) and the amount of effort the other agent invested on the basis of this expectation. The results support the hypothesis that these two factors enhance people's sense of commitment in joint activity.</p>
10	<p>Denis Omar Verduga Palencia and Magda Osman (Queen Mary, London): <i>“A Platform for analysis of human foraging tasks in a computer game context.”</i></p> <p>Foraging activities provide an approach to the psychology of decision making because when an agent forages in an environment that could include other agents that are also foraging it needs to make trade-offs between maximize resources and avoid unnecessary effort, delay or risk.</p> <p>A setting based on activities found in Real Time Strategy games is useful because in such scenario participants needs to explore an environment with partial information and stochastic actions in a competitive setting and foraging in this context can be described as multi-agent central place recurrent foraging, given the commitment required in carrying a subset of the resources from a collection point to a storage point.</p> <p>We are interested in analysing how gaining information about distribution of resources, competitors and risks affects the foraging strategies as well as the optimality/suboptimality of performance while at the same time provide a technological platform that allows to capture the data associated with those decisions.</p> <p>This platform allows to manipulate experimental variables regarding visibility, resource availability and presence of other foragers and predators, while data from environment and participants is recorded in different time frames that allows high temporal granularity.</p> <p>The goal of this poster is to report the development of an open-source web-platform to create experiments and collect data from human foraging tasks in a dynamic environment based in the peculiarities of a RTS game as well as present one experiment made in this tool.</p>
11	<p>Adrian Ziółkowski (Warsaw): <i>“Explaining away undesired knowledge attributions: protagonist projection”</i></p> <p>Many epistemologists believe that counterexamples to classic theory of knowledge proposed by Edmund Gettier provide an ultimate refutation of that theory. Gettier cases describe situations in which cognitive agents possess certain true and justified beliefs (which, according to the classic analysis, should count as knowledge) but nevertheless elicit intuitions that the agents in question do not know the relevant propositions. Since then Gettier scenarios (and other similar cases introduced later that we will call “Gettier-style cases”) have become the crucial test that any proposed analysis of knowledge needs to pass.</p> <p>However, recently some philosophers (e.g. Starmans, Friedman 2012) famously argued that it is unclear that Gettier (and Gettier-style) cases unequivocally elicit intuitions shared by epistemologists. It turned out that many subjects not trained in philosophy tend to attribute knowledge in such situations. While this may not be problematic for original Gettier cases, where still most non-philosophers deny knowledge, it is a serious issue for other, more elaborate Gettier-style cases (similar to Fake Barns scenario introduced by Goldman, 1976), where majority of subjects are happy to attribute knowledge against philosophical consensus. The former type of cases (sometimes called “Apparent Evidence cases”) is believed to be less important, since the crucial belief is a result of an impaired cognitive process (e.g. valid reasoning from false premises), which may violate the justification requirement. The latter type, also known as “Authentic Evidence cases”, do not have that trait.</p> <p>One interesting attempt to tackle these undesired attributions of knowledge rests on the reference to a phenomenon known as protagonist projection, which consists in a tendency to answer questions from the cognitive perspective of the protagonist of the presented scenario (e.g. Buckwalter, 2014). In this vein, Nagel et. al (2013) asked their subjects about knowledge twice – first, in a straightforward way, and then, by offering an opportunity to withdraw the initial attribution and indicate that it was supposed to convey the claim that the protagonist of the scenario believed to have knowledge, but in fact did not have it. It turned out that most</p>

	<p>subjects who initially attributed knowledge in fact project the perspective of the protagonist. Similar results were obtained by Machery et. al (2017). However, most of the data collected so far concerns Apparent Evidence cases.</p> <p>We will focus on Authentic Evidence cases and aim at establishing whether the strong tendency of non-philosophers to attribute knowledge in such cases stems from subjects' inclination to project the cognitive perspective of the protagonists in the scenarios. If that turned out true, folk intuitions concerning these cases could not be treated as genuine knowledge attributions and would not be inconsistent with philosophical tradition. We will present empirical data on five different Authentic Evidence cases. The results are more than unfavourable to the Projection Hypothesis – while there is some level of projection in subjects' answers, it remains considerably small across all tested cases. Majority of participants tend to attribute knowledge in Authentic Evidence cases even if they are offered an opportunity to withdraw their initial attribution. Undesired folk attributions of knowledge cannot be explained away by protagonist projection.</p>
12	<p>Silvia Ivani, Matteo Colombo and Leandra Bucher (Tilburg, Wuppertal) <i>“Uncertainty in Science: A Study on the Role of Non-Cognitive Values in the Assessment of Inductive Risk.”</i></p> <p>Women are frequently excluded from clinical trials because of high costs (women are expensive to test because of hormone fluctuations) and medical concern (clinical trials are potentially dangerous for women's fertility). Many scientists question the reliability of these clinical trials (see Simon 2005): because of sex differences in drug reactions, both women and men must be tested. This prevents health risks for both sexes. Clinical trials involving both sexes are now often conducted. Still, uncertainty remains about the right methodological choice to take.</p> <p>Scientific research involves uncertainty. Scientists have to take decisions about methodologies and hypotheses and each one of these decisions involves uncertainty. Lack of sufficient evidence and disagreements about methodologies – as the example above shows – are sources of uncertainty that can introduce error in scientific reasoning. One kind of error is associated with the notion of inductive risk, i.e., the chance of taking wrong decisions, such as accepting a hypothesis that is in fact false. Philosophers argue that inductive risk challenges the ideal of value-free science, i.e., the idea that non-cognitive values (e.g. moral and economic values) do not influence research, and it shows their actual beneficial role in science (Hempel 1965; Douglas 2000). Specifically, considering non-cognitive values is beneficial when taking wrong decisions may involve non-cognitive consequences, such as harming women's health.</p> <p>Our study aims at investigating the relation between non-cognitive values and inductive risk. We present the results of an experimental study clarifying the psychological impact of political values and personal features like one's race and sex on the acceptance (or rejection) of scientific hypotheses in the face of inductive risk. Our hypotheses was that political and personal identity features reliably predict people's sensitivity to scientific errors. Specifically, people are less likely to accept hypotheses that they perceive as clashing with their political ideology and identity.</p> <p>In our study, participants were asked to read and evaluate three vignettes, where scientists disagree about the adequacy of a specific test and take decisions about hypotheses involving sexual or racial differences. In each vignette, the consequences of a mistaken decision could harm a group of people (either women, men, black or white people). One of the vignettes concerned the exclusion of women from clinical trials. In this vignette, scientists decided to introduce a new drug tested on a group including only men into the market. Participants were asked to express how certain they were that the decision taken was a good one. Our hypothesis was that conservative men were more likely than women to see that decision as a good decision. At the end of the survey, information about political ideology, race, and sex was collected.</p> <p>Our results provide us with a more nuanced understanding of the bearing of non-cognitive values on the psychology of inductive risk. Though philosophers of science have drawn on several historical case-studies to clarify the notion of inductive risk, little attention has been paid to how people actually reason about inductive risks. In this paper, we set out to begin filling this gap in the philosophical literature by investigating the relationship between reasoning, inductive risk, and non-cognitive values</p>

13	<p>Wanqing Xu (Beijing): “Corporations Are Proper Moral Responsibility Bearers The Evidence from Experimental Philosophy.”</p> <p>When a good or bad result is caused by a corporation, can we praise or blame it? Is a corporation a proper agent to bear moral responsibility? This question is one of the most fundamental but controversial topic in business ethics. This discussion is widely described as “corporate moral agency” debate. The moral status of an individual human being which is widely accepted but the moral status of corporate agent is far from clear (Moore, 1999).</p> <p>Comparing to individuals, a corporation does not have a biological brain to make decisions and an “alive” body to act. At the same time, it does contain the members who have brains and real bodies. So when a positive or negative consequence has come out of a company, do normal people think the company have made the decision to act and deserve praise or blame? The debate has been lasting for more than thirty years and the main routine to solve the problem is to find out the conditions for moral agent and then to test if the corporation could satisfy the conditions. The opening thrust in the debate came from Perter French’s seminal work. French (1979) puts forward two conditions to identify a moral agent — causation and intentionality, and the key to prove whether a corporate is a sufficientmoral agent is to prove whether a corporate had intentionality.</p> <p>The internal decision structures (CIDs) provide sufficient intentionality, so a corporate is a moral person. But Velasquez (1983) claims that the corporation is not able to intend an action. Rönnegar (2013) extends Velasquez’s theory as a corporation does not own autonomy, so a corporation can not to be treated as a moral agent. It seems a trend of the discussion ofcorporate moral agency debate now. However, the experimental philosophy tells a different story. Our discussion is attempted to add some empirical evidence which is applied the approach of experimental philosophy to support that the corporation is able to hold moralresponsibility and to explain that the moderators of corporate moral responsibility isautonomy. We committee two experiments to explore how do the normal people think about the debate of corporate moral agency. The participants read the vignette of “Knobe effect” with some changes and then answer several questions about if they think the corporate should be blame or praise and if the corporate has autonomy. The results showthat when the good result is caused by the corporation, people intend to not praise thecorporation while the bad result is caused by the corporation, people intend to blamethe corporation. And no matter if the decision making process is shown clearly or not,people intend to think the corporation has the ability to intend and act freely, which means they think the corporation has autonomy. The results also show that the corporateautonomy influence the individuals’ autonomy. The corporate autonomy and individual’s autonomy influence the moral judgments of normal people.</p>
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